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Bankruptcy
LEONARD H. GILBERT* AND ROBERT PASS**
The authors survey the significant developments in bank-
ruptcy, with particular emphasis on decisions - both state and
federal - important to the Florida practitioner. Areas of empha-
sis include exemptions, the rights of secured parties and lessors,
procedure and discharges. Throughout the article the authors
make reference to pertinent decisions involving Florida's Uniform
Commercial Code.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in the law of bankruptcy,' an area of ex-
clusive federal legislation, can in a sense be studied on a state-by-
state basis. While all true "bankruptcy law" is federal in nature,'
important rights in bankruptcy are regularly determined by refer-
ence to the laws of the state in which the bankruptcy court sits.
Indeed, if the reported Florida bankruptcy decisions are an
accurate indicator, rarely are the bankruptcy courts required to look
to the laws of a state other than the one in which they sit. Accord-
ingly, this article's focus upon the decisions rendered by the bank-
ruptcy and district courts sitting in Florida should have utility for
the Florida lawyer. Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit are also selectively reviewed. In order to retain
relevance for the Florida lawyer, only those Fifth Circuit decisions
which construed Florida law or involved generally significant issues
of federal bankruptcy law are highlighted.
II. JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
A. Summary Jurisdiction over Public Utilities
A bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction is generally limited
to the adjudication of rights and claims pertaining to property in the
actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court.3 When a
controversy involves property in the actual or constructive posses-
1. For earlier developments, see Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1976 Developments in
Florida Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 791 (1977).
2. See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970). The Bankruptcy Act is referred to
in this article as the "Act," and all citations herein are to the Act. A cross reference table
correlating references to the Act with the United States Code appears at 11 U.S.C.A. xiv
(1973).
3. See Herbert v. Crawford, 228 U.S. 204 (1913). For a thorough discussion of summary
jurisdictioh, see Suskin & Swing, Ownership as a Basis for Summary Jurisdiction in Chapter
XI Arrangements, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 307 (1977).
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sion of a third person asserting a bona fide adverse claim, the bank-
ruptcy court may not assert summary jurisdiction without the
claimant's consent. Absent such consent, suit must be brought in a
court of appropriate jurisdiction, not the bankruptcy court., Unlike
the federal district courts, subject matter jurisdiction may be con-
ferred upon the bankruptcy court by the third party's consent or
waiver.'
A recent development concerning the bankruptcy court's sum-
mary jurisdiction was presented in In re Security Investment Prop-
erties, Inc.' In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that a bankruptcy court lacks summary jurisdiction to compel
a public utility to render future service to delinquent customers
without an adequate security deposit. The court reviewed an order
of the bankruptcy court that restrained an electric utility from im-
posing any security requirement upon a chapter XI debtor as a
precondition to future electric service. The district court had af-
firmed the bankruptcy court, interpreting South Central Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Simon (In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp.)' as empower-
ing the bankruptcy court to predicate summary jurisdiction over
such a public utility on the debtor's "property right" in the utility
service.
Distinguishing its landmark Fontainebleau holding, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed. The court drew an important distinction between
the "property right" involved in Fontainebleau and the alleged
property right involved in the case before it.' In Fontainebleau, the
court found that the debtor, a famous resort hotel, had obtained a
"unique property interest" in its telephone number, which had be-
come widely known and had appeared in guidebooks, billboards and
other publicity items. The phone company in Fontainebleau argued
that the bankruptcy court lacked summary jurisdiction to enjoin it
from requiring the payment of a deposit as a precondition to contin-
ued service under the existing telephone numbers.
Thus, the question in Fontainebleau was whether the hotel
debtor had actual or constructive "possession" of its telephone
4. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926); Jan C. Uiterwyk Co. v. Brock, 500 F.2d
390 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 23.08 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as CoLLIER].
6. 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977).
7. 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. The right to receive electricity, the court held, does not constitute a "property right"
that can be within the actual or constructive possession of the court; therefore, the court
lacked summary jurisdiction to order continuation of the service without the payment of a
deposit.
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numbers.9 In holding that the hotel had such possession, which
allowed the bankruptcy court to gain summary jurisdiction,
Fontainebleau rejected the holdings of the Ninth and Second Cir-
cuits to the effect that there is no such property right. 0
There is no comparison, at least according to the Fifth Circuit,
between the "property right" obtained by Fontainebleau Hotel by
advertising its unique telephone number, and the simple right to
receive electrical service. The court concluded that, although "a
demand for a deposit securing present utility services may threaten
to send a Chapter XI debtor into bankruptcy . . . this possible
hindrance . . .cannot bootstrap the bankruptcy court's summary
jurisdiction to cover property rights . . . not in the actual or con-
structive possession of the debtor.""
B. Jurisdiction to Declare Rights in Exempt Property
A bankruptcy court is deprived of jurisdiction over property
once it has been determined to be exempt. 2
In In re Louis VerneU1, Jr.,"3 where the bankrupt was married
at the time of the filing of the petition (therefore making the prop-
erty technically exempt as homestead), the bankruptcy court re-
fused to retain jurisdiction over the property because a state court
had previously ruled the property nonexempt and subject to levy in
satisfaction of a claim against the bankrupt arising prior to the
property's existence as homestead. The fact that exempt property
is subject to equities, liens or judgments is of no concern to the
bankruptcy court, 4 and a bankruptcy court, without jurisdiction, is
unable to rule on a particular person's right to avoid the general
homestead exemption.
III. EXEMPTIONS
Closely related to the determination of jurisdiction over exempt
9. 508 F.2d at 1058. The court observed that the utility "virtually conceded" that it had
no purpose in changing the numbers other than to induce payment of the debt.
10. See In re Vest Re-Mfg. Co., 453 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Roughman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel, Co., 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Slenderella Sys., Inc. v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961). However, as the Fontainebleau decision noted,
the First Circuit had appreciated, at least, the value of telephone numbers by preventing the
bankrupt from conveying them to increase the value of the bankrupt's estate. Darman v.
Metropolitan Alarm Co., 528 F.2d 908 (lst Cir. 1976).
11. 559 F.2d at 1326.
12. See May v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 313 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1962); In re Powers, 339
F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Wetzel v. Idaho State Bank, 366 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Idaho
1973).
13. 11 C.B.C. 162 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
14. Id. at 164.
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property is a determination of the exemptions themselves. Since
exempt property constitutes no part of the bankrupt's estate, the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is limited to the power to preserve
intact all exempt property for the bankrupt. 5 Exempt property does
not pass to the trustee" and is not considered in determining insol-
vency. 17
The Florida bankruptcy courts were more actively involved in
the determination of the availability of exemptions in 1977 than in
prior years. There were a number of notable decisions.
A. Homestead
1. SURVIVING SPOUSE
Judson v. Deboliac,18 in an apparent departure from prior Flor-
ida judicial construction of the homestead exemption, held that
homestead property passes to the surviving spouse and retains its
homestead character, even though the surviving spouse is not the
"head of a family." The bankrupt, a surviving spouse with no chil-
dren, had previously owned homestead property in a tenancy by the
entirety with her husband. After his death, she sought to claim the
homestead, which she occupied, as exempt. 9 Regardless of whether
she was in fact the head of the family, the district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court by holding that the surviving spouse was enti-
tled to a continuation of the homestead property's exempt status.20
The trustee contended that a surviving spouse, living alone, was not
entitled to the exemption and proffered a number of decisions which
seemed to recognize that the Florida Constitution did not authorize
15. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(11), 70a, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 110 (1970). See also 1A COLLIER
605[1]. Section 6 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), provides that the Act
shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed
by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the time of the
filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
16. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
17. Id. § 70d, 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1970).
18. 14 C.B.C. 66 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
19. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; FLA. STAT. § 222.19 (1977).
20. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 provides, in part:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale . . . and no judgment shall be
a lien [on] . . . the following property owned by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead. . . upon which the exemption shall be limited
to the residence of the owner or his family;
(b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the
owner.
The legislature apparently intended to make the homestead exemption available to a
surviving spouse living alone. See FLA. STAT. § 222.19 (1977).
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the continuation of exempt status for homestead property in the
surviving spouse unless she also constituted the head of the family.2
The bankruptcy court cited Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc.22 for
the proposition that the legislature is free to interpret the Florida
Constitution in order to allow the surviving widow to be the "head
of the family." In Jasper, the issue was whether the statute, exempt-
ing all homes meeting the established standards, was within the
constitutional mandate that property tax exemptions shall not be
granted except for charitable purposes. The court found that it was
within the legislature's prerogative to include an old-age home in
the constitution's protection regardless of the sources of the in-
mates' financial support. 3
In sum, Deboliac appears eminently correct, despite decisions
interpreting the constitutional homestead provisions to the con-
trary."
2. "BUSINESS HOUSE"
In In re The Back Porch,5 the bankruptcy court upheld the
bankrupt's homestead exemption claim for a three-story dwelling,
a large portion of which was constructed as rental apartments. The
constitution provides that the homestead is "limited to the resi-
dence of the owner or his family."2 The old constitution, however,
provided that the homestead protection was not to "extend to more
improvements or buildings than the residence and business house
of the owner." 27
Thus, the 1968 excision of the term "business house" from the
original homestead exemption language, leaving the current exemp-
tions "limited to the residence of the owner or his family," reasona-
bly implies that the homestead exemption is now more narrow than
before. Although the former constitution did not define "residence
21. In Bendl v. Bendl, 246 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), it was held that upon
the husband's death the homestead exemption ceases absent a showing that the widow is the
head of the family. Compare Regero v. Daugherty, 69 So. 2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1954) with
Menendez v. Rodriguez, 143 So. 223, 226 (Fla. 1932) (concurring opinion).
22. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
23. "The test for measuring such legislation against the constitutional restraints must
be that of reasonable relationship between the specifically described exemption and one of
the purposes which the Constitution requires to be served." Id. at 825.
24. See note 21 supra. Prior to the 1968 constitutional revision, it was provided that the
homestead exemption "shall inure to the widow . . . entitled to such exemption." FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 2 (1964). The omission of the "entitled to" language strongly implies that
the legislature's newest construction was written as intended in FLA. STAT. § 222.19 (1977).
25. No. 77-26 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1977).
26. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
27. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1964) (emphasis added).
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and business house," it was broadly viewed as "the owner's actual
residence . . . [and] improvements . . . being used as a means of
making the owner's livelihood. '2 8 In any event, it has long been
settled that the homestead exemption was to be "interpreted in the
liberal and beneficent spirit in which [it was] . . . conceived and
enacted in the interest of the family home '."2 Rental garages, apart-
ments and paint shops attached to the actual residence of the owner
were within the former constitution's exemptions."
In The Back Porch,3 although the claimed homestead was an
apartment house, at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed,
the building was occupied exclusively by the bankrupt and the
immediate members of his family, who paid no rent. The trustee
argued that the absence of the "business house" reference in the
new constitution meant that income-producing property, even if
part of the residence, is not exempt. The bankruptcy court, how-
ever, upheld the exemption claim of the debtor, curiously holding
that the constitution does not qualify the homestead exemption by
its use, but by its size.
The court responded to the trustee's argument, as well as the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Weiss v. Stone" (decided
under the old constitution), by finding that where only part of the
property is a dwelling house and part is used for business, "the
extent of the exemption would depend on all surrounding facts, and
circumstances, and if the examination of the property reveals that
it is more than the 'residence and business house' of the owner, the
nonoccupied portion should be removed from the homestead exemp-
tion."33 The bankruptcy court conceded that it would be contrary
to the constitution's intent to permit an exemption claim for com-
mercial property which was completely detached from the actual
dwelling.
28. Cowdery v. Herring, 143 So. 433, 435 (Fla. 1932), quoted in White v. Posick, 150 So.
2d 263, 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
29. Marsh v. Hartly, 109 So. 2d 34, 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959), quoted in White v. Posick,
150 So. 2d at 265-66.
30. See Heil Co. v. Lavieri, 205 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
31. No. 77-26 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1977).
32. 220 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1969). In that case, the property for which the homestead
exemption was claimed consisted of three contiguous lots of land and a one-story, five-unit
apartment building, of which the defendant occupied one apartment. The trial court held
that all the property except that actually occupied by the bankrupt was subject to the
homestead exemption. The appellate court affirmed. Weiss v. Stone, however, was decided
under the old constitution, which contained the "business house" language. No recorded
decision has yet determined what effect, if any, the excision of the "business house" language
has had upon the scope of the homestead exemption.
33. No. 77-26 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1977).
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The court found that, at all relevant times, none of the remain-
ing units were rented and none were income-producing. In addition,
because there was no way to separate the building, it was impossible
to allocate exempt and nonexempt status among the units, even if
some had been income-producing. 4
While probably correct on its facts, the conclusion in The Back
Porch, that the homestead exemption is dependent not on the use
of the property but only upon its size, seems inconsistent with the
implication of the constitutional change removing the "business
house" language. The full implication of that change remains to be
decided. So far, however, it appears that the bankruptcy court will
be reluctant to read that change very broadly in derogation of the
debtor's exemption.
B. Tort Claims
Tort claims for slander, libel or personal injuries, which can
transform a bankrupt into a wealthy person overnight when reduced
to judgment, continue to enjoy an effective "exempt" status, as
illustrated by In re Gavin.5 After bankruptcy, the bankrupt settled
a tort claim that was pending at the time of filing the petition. The
court first ordered the settlement check turned over to the trustee,
but eventually exempted the proceeds of the suit on the ground that
the Act prohibits the trustee from taking title to "rights of action
ex delicto for libel, slander, [or] injuries to the person of the bank-
rupt . . . unless by the law of the State such actions are subject to
attachment . . . ."I Under Florida law, tort claims are not subject
to attachment or execution until they are liquidated into a sum
certain.37
Of course, although the tort claim became certain and liqui-
34. Id.
35. No. 76-1431 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 1977).
36. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970).
37. Although the court correctly held that a chose in action for a tort claim is generally
not subject to attachment or garnishment in Florida, the court's rationale is nonetheless
somewhat confused. Choses in action of any kind are immune from attachment under FLA.
STAT. § 76.01 (1977), which only authorizes the attachment of "goods and chattels, lands and
tenements." Choses in action for many torts are also not subject to garnishment because the
writ reaches only a chose in action for a "debt due" the person holding the chose in action,
and then only when the debt due is unconditional and liquidated in nature. See Cobb v.
Walker, 198 So. 324 (1940); FLA. STAT. § 77.01 (1977). Although Gavin appeared to rely in
part upon the generally unliquidated and contingent nature of a tort claim, it also relied on
Id. § 77.02, which provides that a writ of garnishment will not issue upon a chose in action
sounding in tort. This statute has nothing to do with the central issue in Gavin.
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dated when reduced to judgment or settlement, it then escaped
inclusion in the bankrupt estate as after-acquired property.38
C. Property Taxes
Article VII, section 3(a) of the 1968 Constitution of Florida
exempts from taxation property "used predominately for educa-
tional, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." The leg-
islature has recently decided to grant a tax exemption to private
hospitals under this section on the ground that they are
"charitable" in nature." The legislature defined the term "used
predominately for . . charitable purposes," as used in article VII,
section 3(a), as meaning "property used for exempt purposes in
excess of fifty percent but less than exclusive."40
The exempting statute also provides that, in determining the
amount of exemption for hospitals, "portions of the property leased
as parking lots or parking garages operated by private enterprise
shall not be deemed to be serving an exempt purpose and shall not
be exempt from taxation.""
In Blake v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Tower, Inc. (In re Ce-
dars of Lebanon Hospital Tower, Inc. ),4" the bankruptcy court cbn-
sidered the applicability of that exemption to a tax exempt hospital
with a substantial parking facility operated by private enterprise.
The actual use of the parking area, which contained 624 spaces and
which was also available for use by persons visiting doctors' offices,
a pharmacy and a convenience grocery housed therein, was found
to be "negligible" for hospital purposes. The entire lot was available
exclusively for hospital use, however.
The court considered all the parking spaces in the complex,
regardless of who owned the underlying land. The bankruptcy court
appeared to stress that the availability of parking spaces is less
important than their actual use since it found that only one-half of
the parking facilities were used for any purpose and that even fewer
spaces were used exclusively for hospital purposes.
Cedars of Lebanon indicates that by simply building too many
parking spaces, either to comply with local ordinances or to prepare
38. Generally, property obtained by the bankrupt after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy does not pass to the trustee, whose estate is determined at the time of
"cleavage"-the time of the filing of the petition under section 70b. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
See generally Stein v. Leibowitt (In re Leibowitt), 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937).
39. FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (1977).
40. Id. § 196.012(3).
41. Id. § 196.197(2).
42. No. 74-180 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 1977).
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for future needs, a hospital may forfeit its entire tax exemption. The
court did not clearly state whether a parking garage which is used
to less than half of its capacity, even though used for charitable
purposes, will forfeit its tax exempt status. Such a broad reading
may impose a substantial and unwarranted burden upon charitable
hospitals.
D. Disability Payments
In In re Witlin,'3 a case of first impression, the court ruled that
premature disability disbursements under a Keogh plan"4 are not
exempt from passing to the trustee." The court construed the plan
as an annuity with an incidental right to premature withdrawal and
held that the fact that every Keogh plan contains a spendthrift
provision, precluding assignment or alienation,'" does not render
them exempt.'7
In In re Prestein,s the issue was whether the bankrupt could
exempt disability insurance payments and civil service commissions
he had received and deposited in his bank account. The bankrupt
argued that the disability payments were exempt under Florida law,
which provides that disability payments are not liable to attach-
ment, garnishment or legal process. 9 He argued that comparable
federal law exempted the civil service commissions. 0
The court was not persuaded. First, it appeared that the bank-
rupt, after segregating the funds, had taken a $25,000 European tour
which rendered him bankrupt. The court refused to allow the debtor
to execute a "premeditated and deliberate plan to resort to bank-
ruptcy and to stand behind the exemption laws to defeat the claims
of [his] creditors."'"
The bankruptcy court's second ground for denying the exemp-
tions is more troublesome. The court simply held that while disabil-
ity insurance payments are exempt before they are paid to the bank-
rupt, they are not exempt once received. The court concluded that
the purpose of disability income benefits was, in large part, to pre-
serve for the bankrupt the right to receive future disability benefits,
43. No. 76-1124 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1977).
44. A Keogh plan, essentially a retirement plan for self-employed persons, defers income
to a later date (though the money may be withdrawn prematurely as disability payments).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1970); FLA. STAT. § 222.18 (1977).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
47. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1957).
48. 11 C.B.C. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
49. FLA. STAT. § 222.18 (1977).
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (Supp. V 1975).
51. 11 C.B.C. at 523.
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replacing the wages he would have earned. Of course, if no disability
benefits were owing, future earnings would not pass to the trustee,
since they would be after-acquired property. The court viewed the
exemption52 as a legislative attempt to "achieve equality in treat-
ment between future earnings and . . .disability benefits." 3 The
bankrupt who accumulates wages in a savings account, according
to the court, should be treated no differently than the bankrupt who
accumulates disability payments in the same manner.
While this much makes sense, the court's analysis was unsatis-
factory insofar as it limited discussion to persons who receive their
disability benefits in lump-sum payments. In making this distinc-
tion, the court noted:
When lump-sum disability settlement are [sic] paid to a benefi-
ciary, that beneficiary thereafter has sole control over the total
amount of the settlement. He can invest in property, exempt or
otherwise, or he can pay his creditors and avoid bankruptcy alto-
gether. The beneficiary of the periodic payments does not have
control over future payments, much as a wage earner does not
have the control over, nor may he spend, future unpaid wages.
Lump-sum beneficiaries enjoy the immediate benefit of disposi-
tion of their lump-sum. In return for this benefit, they must risk
losing their lump-sum if they choose to segregate it from their
creditors and thereby precipitate bankruptcy."
But the fact that a lump-sum beneficiary has immediate con-
trol over the full amount he will receive under the disability con-
tract, while the periodic beneficiary does not, has no substantial
relation to the Bankruptcy Act's recognition of this exemption.
When that bankrupt elects, for whatever reason, to take the
benefits in a lump-sum, it makes little sense to penalize that elec-
tion by holding the entire amount subject to transference to the
trustee. Periodic beneficiaries receive the "fresh start" that the Act
intends. Lump-sum beneficiaries who do not foresee bankruptcy,
however, may not receive this "fresh start," thereby allowing their
creditors to receive a windfall.
A more equitable accommodation of these competing interests
would be attainable by determining, in each case, whether the
debtor truly deserves the benefits of an exemption. Another possi-
bility would be for the lump-sum beneficiary's payment to be pro-
rated, making it correspond to the existing or accrued periodic pay-
52. FLA. STAT. § 222.18 (1977).
53. 11 C.B.C. at 519.
54. Id. at 520.
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ment that the beneficiary would have received had he not elected
lump-sum payment.
The principle invoked by the Prestein court to deny exemptions
to dishonest debtors can always suffice to take care of the debtor
who abuses lump-sum privileges, but its doctrinal extension of the
rule to all cases seems unwarranted.
E. "Luxury Items"
In In re Wilson,55 the bankruptcy court rejected a trustee's
claim that a diamond ring worth $662 was not exempt because it
was a "luxury item." The court disagreed, reluctantly, and held
that the Constitution of Florida,5" which allows heads of households
a $1,000 personal property exemption, does not distinguish between
luxury and nonluxury items. The court refused to follow the holding
in Rivas v. Noble,57 which suggested a contrary result.
F. Personal Property
In In re Bowles,M a bankrupt was held to be entitled to claim
certain office furnishings and equipment as exempt personal prop-
erty. 9 The bankrupt, a practicing attorney who worked in his home,
used the furniture, on which he owed nothing, for both business and
personal functions. The court rejected the trustee's argument that
occasional business use should preclude the exemption.
G. Effect of Fraud
In In re Jeter,1" a bankrupt's knowing and fraudulent conceal-
ment of an interest in real property6' did not operate to deny the
debtor's right to an exemption on other properties. As a result of the
fraud, the bankrupt lost his right to a discharge. 2
Of greater interest was that one of the bankrupt's creditors also
moved to deny the bankrupt's state created exemption on other
property, on "general principles of equity." The bankruptcy court
55. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 816 (Aug. 23, 1977).
56. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2).
57. 241 F. 673 (5th Cir. 1917). In Rivas, a $650 diamond ring was held not exempt, and
was ordered to be turned over to the trustee. The court stated it was unable to find any
authority for an exemption of this item. Id. at 674.
58. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 822 (Aug. 17, 1977).
59. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2) exempts "personal property to the value of one thousand
dollars." See also FLA. STAT. § 222.06 (1977) for the method of exempting personal property.
60. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 821 (Sept. 14, 1977).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
62. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(1), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(1) (1970).
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noted that section 6 of the Act 3 specifically recognizes the availabil-
ity of exemptions existing under state law. The court, however,
found that there was no Florida authority under which a bankrupt's
right to an exemption on certain property was denied on "general
equitable principles" because of fraudulent conduct by the bank-
rupt not relating to that property. 4
The court concluded that fraudulent concealment of some
property from the bankruptcy court has no bearing upon the bank-
rupt's right to exemptions otherwise available under state law on
other property.
IV. PREFERENCES
In Howdeshell Plumbing, Inc. v. American States Insurance
Co. (In re Howdeshell Plumbing, Inc.),5 the bankrupt, a plumbing
contractor, informed the defendants, its bonding companies, that it
would be unable to perform its bonded contracts. Soon thereafter,
defendants made a thorough one month investigation of the bank-
rupt's operations.
Five weeks after the notification, defendants filed indemnity
agreements executed by the bankrupt in favor of the bonding com-
panies. Later that day, defendants, as sureties, appropriated certain
of the bankrupt's equipment. Two weeks after the filing of the in-
demnity agreement, a petition for an arrangement under chapter
XI" was filed.
The trustee argued that the indemnity agreements were voida-
ble preferences 7 under sections 57g"5 and 606 of the Act. The court
found that reasonable cause existed for defendants to know of the
bankrupt's insolvency because of defendants' extensive investiga-
63. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
64. Florida courts have denied a bankrupt's right to a homestead exemption where there
was fraud directly relating to the homestead property. Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106
So. 127 (1925); Ryskind v. Robinson, 302 So. 2d 427 (Fla. lst Dist. 1974).
65. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 711 (July 27, 1977).
66. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
67. See 3 COLLIER 60.57.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1970).
69. Id. § 96. Section 60a(1) of the Act defines a preference as
a transfer. . . of any property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or
on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding . . . the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class.
11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
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tion and concluded that the elements of a voidable preference were
present.70
In Gorman v. Atlas Mortgage and Insurance Co. (In re Hamach
Utilities Construction, Inc.)," the bankrupt, while insolvent, deliv-
ered an insurance check to a creditor to satisfy an antecedent debt.
At the time, the creditor held two promissory notes executed by the
bankrupt, which were over five months delinquent. The bankrupt's
business office had been closed, and all its vehicles were gone.
The creditor was held to have knowledge of the insolvency at
the time of the transfer, and the preference was declared voidable.
"It is sufficient that a state of facts has been brought to the credi-
tor's attention concerning the affairs and financial condition of the
Bankrupt which would lead a prudent businessman to the conclu-
sion that the Bankrupt is insolvent."7
V. SECURED PARTIES AND LESSORS
A. Creditors
In ITT Automotive Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Gorman (In re
Nordic Enterprises, Inc.),73 a proceeding to determine the validity
and enforceability of a security interest in the bankrupt's inventory,
the trustee argued that the creditor had disposed of the collateral
in a "commercially unreasonable manner,"7 thereby forfeiting its
right to a deficiency and to the entire security interest. 5
The creditor had obtained a state court judgment requiring the
bankrupt to turn over its inventory to the creditor, who then notified
the bankrupt that it would offer the inventory for sale on one week's
notice.71 On the day of notification, the voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed. The creditor took possession of the collateral, mak-
ing a bookkeeping entry crediting the bankrupt's open account, but
the sale was never held. The trustee, meanwhile, did not subse-
quently assert any right of possession in the collateral.
70. See note 69 supra. The indemnity agreement was for an antecedent debt since it was
executed at an earlier date than it was filed. It does diminish the estate for unsecured
creditors as a class, since it would withdraw the secured property from the estate available
for later distribution.
71. 12 C.B.C. 646 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
72. Id. at 650. See also Judson v. Popular Bank (In re Decorators Unlimited, Inc.), No.
76-442 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1977) (suggesting that the creditor should have examined the
debtor's business records, since the creditor, the bankrupt's bank, had been refused access
to financial statements over one year prior to the preferential transfer).
73. No. 74-662 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 1977).
74. See FLA. STAT. § 679.504(3) (1977).
75. Id. § 679.507.
76. Id. § 679.504(3).
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The court observed that because the creditor's interest on the
date of filing was only a security interest, the automatic stay provi-
sion under Bankruptcy Rule 60177 would be determinative of the
validity of the transfer in question.
The trustee was thus entitled to restoration of the collateral as
it existed on the date the petition was filed. In addition, section 9-
504 of the Uniform Commercial Code,78 relating to "commercial
reasonableness," would not apply unless the secured party elected
to liquidate the collateral. Since there was no equity in the property,
the estate was not authorized to retain it.
B. Reclamation Rights of Sellers and Consignors
1. SELLERS
One of the major questions existing under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is whether the section 2-70211 reclamation rights re-
flect a security interest or simply a right to undo the transaction."
The determination of whether the right to reclaim is a security
interest could mean the difference between a creditor being treated
as unsecured or secured in the bankruptcy court, and the question
of how the secured interest is perfected could be of even greater
importance in terms of priorities.
Substantial disagreement also exists over whether the seller's
interest under section 2-702 8 is a statutory lien "which first becomes
effective upon the insolvency," and is therefore invalidated by sec-
tion 67c(1)(A) of the Act.82 In Florida, because section 2-702 has not
been amended to eliminate the superior position of the lien creditor
over the defrauded seller, the trustee in bankruptcy becomes a supe-
77. Bankruptcy Act, Rule 601, 11 U.S.C. Rule 601 (Supp. mI 1973).
78. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(3) (1977).
79. Id. § 672.702.
80. Section 672.702 provides in pertinent part:
(2) where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within 10 days after
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within 3 months before delivery the 10-day limitation does not
apply : .
(3) The seller's right to reclaim . . . is subject to the rights of a . . . lien
creditor . . . . Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with
respect to them.
81. Id.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A). Compare Carnation Plastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc. (In re
Giltex, Inc.), 17 U.C.C. Rep. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (invalidating as statutory lien); In re Good
Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D. N.J. 1974) and In re Federals, Inc., 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (invalidating as to trustee) with Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holz-
man (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.), 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975).
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rior lien creditor under section 70c of the Act, 3 the "strong-arm"
clause.
In Marcrest Pacific Co. v. Celtic Corp. (In re Celtic Corp. ),8" a
defrauded seller claimed that he was entitled to a general lien on
all the debtor's assets because the debtor had disposed of property
purchased from the creditor without payment. On the same day
that the bankrupt filed under chapter XI, the creditor delivered
steel beams to the debtor's plant. Four days later, the seller de-
manded return of the beams under 2-702(2) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.85 The bankrupt debtor refused the demand.
By the time the action was commenced, the bankrupt no longer
possessed the beams. They had been used in the construction of
mobile homes, which the bankrupt had sold. Under the Florida
version of section 2-702, the seller's rights cannot be enforced
against the trustee, who becomes a lienor under section 70c of the
Act."5
2. CONSIGNORS
In Gorman v. Penny (In re Trier's Kimball Piano and Organ
Center, Inc.),7 the bankrupt sold organs and pianos on a consign-
ment basis, as consignee. None of the consignors had executed secu-
rity agreements or filed financing statements, but when the consig-
nee filed for bankruptcy, the consignors brought an action to re-
claim their property.
Section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code" provides that
goods sold on a "sale or return" basis are subject to claims of the
consignee's creditors while in the consignee's possession, unless the
consignor establishes that the consignee's creditors are aware of the
consignments." A consignor may also protect his property by per-
fecting a security interest in the property under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code °
In this case, the court held that where a "majority" of the
83. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
84. 13 C.B.C. 478 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
85. See note 80 supra.
86. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). The court also found it unnecessary
to determine whether the § 2-702 reclamation right is a statutory lien, a disguised priority or
a voidable preference, because the collateral was not in the debtor's possession and could not
be traced. Marcrest Pac. Co. v. Celtic Corp. (In re Celtic Corp.), 13 C.B.C. at 482.
87. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1005 (July 18, 1977).
88. FLA. STAT. § 672.326 (1977).
89. Id. § 672.326(3). In the absence of such a statute, the consigned property is subject
to the trustee's claim. See 4A COLLIER 70.1815].
90. FLA. STAT. § 672.326(3)(c) (1977).
[Vol. 32:781
BANKRUPTCY
consignee's creditors knows that the consignee deals in the goods of
others, the consignor will prevail as to all creditors."
C. "Cram-Downs"
In In re Georgetown Apartments," the bankruptcy court held,
inter alia, that a chapter XII arrangement 3 could not be accepted
by the vote of all unsecured creditors over the rejection of the plan
by secured creditors, even though the secured creditors would be
adequately protected under the Act's "cram-down" provisions."
The debtor, a partnership engaged in the management of apartment
houses, had obtained the unanimous approval of its unsecured cred-
itors of a plan of arrangement, and several alternative plans. All of
the plans had been rejected by the secured creditors, who were
mortgagees. The secured creditors moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the plan could not be confirmed over the unanimous
opposition of the secured creditors. The debtor sought confirmation,
in response, on the ground that the acceptance of the secured credi-
tors was unnecessary, since the secured creditors were not "affected
by the plan."' 5 Even if the secured creditors were affected, the
debtor claimed they were adequately protected by section
461(11)(d) of the Act."
Under section 407 of the Act, 7 creditors are "affected" by an
arrangement only if their interest shall be materially and adversely
affected thereby. Under section 468,'1 an application for confirma-
tion may be filed with the court after the plan is accepted by the
affected creditors holding two-thirds of the debts; creditors who are
either not affected or who are protected by section 461(11)" are not
included in this computation. 00
Section 461(11) of the Act, known as the "cram-down" provi-
sion, protects classes of creditors by the transfer or sale of property
by the debtor, payment in cash or any other equitable method that
91. This is arguably consistent with the language of § 672.326(3)(b) that the consignee
"is generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others." See also Buchanan v. Mobile Home Guar. Co. (In re Int'l Mobile Homes), 14 U.C.C.
Rep. 1150 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); In re Fabers, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 126 (D. Conn. 1972); Guard-
ian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Va. App. 418, 151 S.E.2d 530 (1966).
92. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 512 (July 12, 1977).
93. Bankruptcy Act ch. XII, 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1970).
94. Id. § 461(11), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11).
95. See id. § 407, 11 U.S.C. § 807.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 861(11)(d) (1970).
97. Id. § 807.
98. Id. § 868.
99. Id. § 861(11).
100. Marcrest Pac. Co. v. Celtic Corp., 13 C.B.C. 478, 505 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
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will adequately protect the creditors.
In Georgetown Apartments, after determining that the total
value of the debtor's property was greater than the secured debt,, 1
the court held that the secured creditors would be "affected." The
debtor, meanwhile, had argued that the secured creditors would not
be "affected" since the proposed plan would have furnished the
creditors the same as that which they would have received on fore-
closure-net cash flow from the property. 102
The court felt that this argument ignored the proper test to
determine whether a creditor has been affected.
If the effect of the arrangement is to impair the actual value of
the creditor's claim or to prejudice any of the legal incidents of
the claim, then . . . the interest of the creditor is materially and
adversely affected. . . . But aside from general creditors who are
being paid in full in cash, it seems that any creditor who is dealt
with in the arrangement is materially and adversely affected
thereby.'03
The bankruptcy court held that the creditors were "affected"
because they were deprived of some of the legal incidents of the
debt-the right to immediate payment of the amount past due and
the right to monthly payments under the mortgage. Moreover, the
court felt that nothing less than full payment would provide
"adequate protection" for the creditors, since the value of the prop-
erty exceeded the amount of the debt.'0'
A vote of unsecured creditors, according to the court, may not
compel acceptance of the plan over the unanimous rejection of the
secured creditors. Just because the secured creditors are adequately
protected does not authorize the bankruptcy court to force accept-
ance, if the creditors are unanimously opposed to the plan.'
0 5
The court further held that a plan extending a mortgage held
by a creditor for five years, with the creditor to be paid all remaining
101. In such situation, under the cram-down provision, the creditors may be forced to
accept less than the value of the debt.
102. The debtor argued that the secured creditors would receive only the net cash flow
on foreclosure because no third party would bid on the property at the foreclosure sale, with
the result that the secured creditor would, in any event, be forced to operate the property. 13
C.B.C. at 505.
103. In re Georgetown Apartments, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 516 (quoting 8 COLLIER
243).
104. See Rader v. Boyd, 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959); In re Nob Hill Apartments, 11
C.B.C. 101 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
105. In re Georgetown Apartments, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 519. See Meyer v.
Rowen, 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1952); Security Title Ins. Co. v. Alpine & Lake Tahoe
Paradise, Ltd. (In re Alpine & Lake Tahoe Paradise, Ltd.), 7 C.B.C. 286 (S.D. Cal. 1975)
(both cited with approval in Georgetown Apartments).
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cash flow after satisfaction of property taxes and maintenance costs,
was not "adequate protection."'' 6
This conclusion, however, is contrary to the language of section
461(11) of the Act,0 7 which seems sufficiently broad to encompass
extended payment plans that eventually provide complete compen-
sation of secured creditors. Furthermore, at least one recent case
construing section 461(11) has sanctioned extended payment of a
mortgage to meet the chapter XII goal of substituting arrangement
for liquidation, when possible.0 8
The state of the law is not as clear as the court in Georgetown
Apartments would make it appear. Section 461(11) was added in
the 1938 Chandler Act0 9 to eliminate the ability of secured creditors
to foil a potentially successful plan of arrangement by foreclosing on
the debtor's real property, often the primary asset of the bankruptcy
estate. The amendment removed secured creditors as an impedi-
ment to a successful arrangement by eliminating the secured party's
right to vote a plan of arrangement once adequate protection has
been provided pursuant to section 461(11)."0
The designed "cram-down" effect was endorsed further by a
1952 amendment"' which removed the "fair and equitable" test
106. In re Georgetown Apartments, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 519.
107. An arrangement-
(11) shall provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does
not accept the arrangement by the two-thirds majority in amount required under
this chapter, adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their
debts against the property dealt with by the arrangement and affected by such
debts, either, as provided in the arrangement or in the order confirming the
arrangement ... (d) by such method as will, under and consistent with the
circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide such protection
Bankruptcy Act § 461, 11 U.S.C. § 861 (1970).
108. In re Triangle Inn Assocs., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 716 (Sept. 15, 1977).
109. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 461, 52 Stat. 921 (1938) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §
861 (1970)).
110. This is clear from the language of § 468:
If an arrangement has not been so accepted, an application for the confirma-
tion of an arrangement may be filed with the court within such time as the court
shall have fixed in the notice of such meeting, or at or after such meeting and
after, but not before-
(1) it has been accepted in writing by the creditors of each class, holding
two-thirds in amount of the debts of such class affected by the arrangement
proved and allowed before the conclusion of the meeting, or before such other time
as may be fixed by the court, exclusive of creditors or of any class of them who
are not affected by the arrangement or for whom payment or protection has been
provided as prescribed in paragraph (11) of section 461 . . ..
Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1970).
111. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-456, § 472, 66 Stat. 835.
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from section 472.112 The amendment was added to prevent secured
creditors from impairing, if not actively making valueless, the relief
provided by chapter XII, by claiming absolute priority to their col-
lateral and disposing of the collateral before the unsecured creditors
could approve a successful arrangement.
Several recent cases likewise support this view of section 461
(11).111 It is clear, then, that this section poses what a district court
in New York described as a "potent threat"114 to the positions of
secured creditors in chapter XII arrangements.
D. Validity of Security Interests
In In re Coed Shop, Inc. ,"' the court held that a lien filed under
the Florida statute"' permitting a lender to use, as collateral, a
debtor's liquor license, does not constitute a central filing system
that may supplant the filing provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code."7 The bankrupt's creditor had taken first lien on
the bankrupt's liquor license and thereafter filed the lien with the
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco; "'8 he did not, however,
file a financing statement under article 9.
Since the trustee, under section 70c of the Act,"' succeeds to
the status of a hypothetical lien creditor at the date of bankruptcy,
a security interest or lien which does not attach or is not perfected
until after the date of bankruptcy is inferior to the trustee's inter-
est.'"
The court also rejected the argument that the erroneous filing
was salvaged by section 9-401(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code,'2' which preserves the effectiveness of a filing made in good
faith but at an improper place or otherwise incorrectly. This section,
the court noted, was designed to allow a filing to be effective if made
in good faith, but only as against persons with actual knowledge of
the existence of the security interest. A trustee in bankruptcy "is
deemed to have complied with all applicable requirements of state
112. 11 U.S.C. § 872 (1970).
113. See Sumida v. Yumen, 409 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Triangle Inn Assocs., 3
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 716 (Sept. 15, 1977); In re Hartsdale Assocs., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 460 (June 16,1977); In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1478 (Oct.
14, 1976).
114. In re Hartsdale Assocs., 3 BANKE. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 464.
115. 435 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
116. FLA. STAT. § 561.65(a) (1977).
117. Id. § 679.302(3)-(4).
118. Id. § 561.65(a).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
120. In re Coed Shop, Inc., 435 F. Supp. at 474.
121. FLA. STAT. § 679.401(2) (1977).
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law for a lien of legal or equitable process and he is without
notice."2 '
E. Lessor's Termination Rights
Section 70b of the Act" 3 declares lease provisions which purport
to terminate a lease upon bankruptcy enforceable. Even so, at least
in reorganizations, the statute has not dispensed completely with
the common law disfavor of forfeitures. 24
In addition, the judiciary has generally been disinclined to en-
force forfeiture provisions if enforcement would substantially impair
the success of the rehabilitation of the debtor or would deprive the
bankruptcy estate of its principal assets. 5
The courts have also effectively circumvented the Act by using
state law; for example, courts have concluded that a landlord had
somehow waived his right to enforce the forfeiture clause,"' and
have otherwise interpreted state law regarding forfeitures in order
to reach the desired result.'27
Moreover, it is now recognized that chapter XI proceedings are
a proper forum for the exercise of the bankruptcy judge's equitable
discretion in preventing lease terminations under such default pro-
visions. 25 Such equitable powers have been employed forcefully
where the lessee is current in his payments and has not impaired
the value of his leasehold, 29 where it would do little good for the
creditor, and where termination would substantially harm the
debtor. 130
In In re Thrift Oil Co.,'"' a bankruptcy termination clause was
enforced, even though the lessor had actual knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, and the lessor had waited four months past filing
122. 435 F. Supp. at 475. See also 4A COLLiER 70.53.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
124. Such provisions are often weighed against the public's interest in successful re-
organizations. See Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123
(1946).
125. See Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. (In re Fon-
tainebleau Hotel Corp.), 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
126. See, e.g., Larkins v. Sills, 377 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Speare, 360 F.2d 882 (2d
Cir. 1966); B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 338 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Geraghty v. Kiamie
Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
127. See, e.g., In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. See In re M&M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. 821, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re D.H.
Overmyer Co., 383 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975).
129. Thus, the court precluded the "unclean hands" defense.
130. See In re M&M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
131. Crowder v. Thrift Oil Co. (In re Thrift Oil Co.), 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1052 (Dec.
2, 1977).
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of the petition to invoke the provision. The court also held that
although the lessor had accepted tardy rental payments, this did not
constitute a waiver of the lessor's right to enforce the termination
provision."3 2 Distinguishing two major cases, 3' the court found that
an unreasonable time period had not elapsed between knowledge
and termination (four months), and that no aspect of public interest
required continuation of the lease.
F. Garnishments
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Bank
of Marin v. England' that a bank which honored checks of a bank-
rupt drawn before its bankruptcy but presented for payment after
the filing of the petition is not liable to the trustee for the amount
of the check, so long as the bank had no knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy.'" Though oft-criticized, Marin has never been overruled.
In In re Ed L. Thomas Co. ,13 despite substantial criticism, the
bankruptcy court extended Marin to absolve a garnishee bank from
liability to the trustee when the bank, which had no knowledge of
the proceedings, satisfied a state court garnishment writ after bank-
ruptcy.3 7
The court here absolved the bank under the Marin rule, since
the bank was required under Florida law to satisfy the writ. In that
sense, its position was analogous to that of the bank in Marin, which
was relieved through the invocation of equity.' 31
132. Id. at 1053.
133. In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd. Wine
& Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974). These cases are especially significant
because of their application of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) at 1054.
134. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
135. The Court held that mere filing of the bankruptcy petition is not per se enough to
put the bank on notice. Using "equitable principles," the Court held that under § 70d(5) of
the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) (1970), "it would be inequitable to hold liable a drawee who
pays checks of the bankrupt duly drawn but presented after bankruptcy, where no actual
revocation of its authority had been made and it had no notice or knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy." 385 U.S. at 103.
136. Raymos v. American Laundry Mach. (In re Ed L. Thomas Co.), 3 BANKS. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 1142 (Dec. 8, 1977).
137. The court so held despite the garnishee bank's claim that it was protected by § 70d
of the Act since, according to the court, that section applies "only to transfers made after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition and before adjudication or before receiver takes posses-
sion of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs." Id. at 1142. Adjudication had
already occurred when the writ was satisfied; therefore, § 70d was inapplicable. See also 4A
COLLIER 70.67.
138. Matin has come to stand for the principle that "bankruptcy courts are essentially
courts of equity to be guided by equitable doctrines and principles." In re Smith, 436 F. Supp.
469, 480 (N.D. Ga. 1977). See also In re Peterson, 437 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1977).
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But the garnisher-creditor did not fare as well. Marin was silent
on the creditor's fate, because there the bankrupt himself had with-
drawn the funds. In Ed L. Thomas Co., the court applied the literal
language of section 70d(5) to require the creditor to remit to the
trustee all funds gleaned by the writ of garnishment.'
Regardless of the wisdom of the decision in Marin, the exten-
sion of its rule in Ed L. Thomas Co. does little, if any, harm to the
bankrupt's estate. Since Matin did not involve a third party creditor
or payee, the Supreme Court of the United States had no opportun-
ity or necessity to rule upon whether the same equitable principles
that protected the bank would protect the payee-creditor. Since the
bankruptcy court here found the presence or absence of good faith
irrelevant, the trustee may still look to the garnisher as an alternate
source of payment.
VI. LIENORS
A. Retail Sales
In In re Kennedy & Cohen, Inc.,"" the bankrupt, because of
liquidation, was unable to perform appliance maintenance con-
tracts, under which it had accepted payment from customers for a
two year period. The court refused to impose a constructive trust
upon the funds so received; a contrary decision would have removed
the funds from the court's jurisdiction. Without a showing of
wrongdoing by the bankrupt, and without an allegation that the
bankrupt knew prior to bankruptcy that the contracts could not be
performed, a constructive trust was not warranted.'
B. Priorities and Choateness
In Florida, the personal property tax is established in two
steps' that are conditions precedent to its choateness. If the county
tax lien does not become choate before the date of a federal lien for
administrative and wage claims, 1 3 the federal lien will prevail."'
Under federal law, a lien is inchoate when the certainty of amount,
139. 3 BANKI. CT. DEC. at 1143.
140. Wisconsin v. Reese (In re Kennedy & Cohen, Inc.), No. 76-97 (S.D. Fla. May 5,
1977).
141. The court also found that a constructive trust could not be imposed without an
identifiable trust res to which the trust could attach.
142. See FLA. STAT. §§ 194.011, 195.096(2), .200 (1977).
143. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(C)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(C)(3) (1970).
144. A federal tax lien is, in actuality, superior to all other liens not choate at the time
the federal tax lien is filed. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); United
States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1977).
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exact identity of the lienor and time of attachment must await
future determination.'4
In the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the "first in time,
first in right" rule of priorities has been held inapplicable, in United
States v. Crittenden,' to a situation involving a prior federal mort-
gage lien and a state-created mechanic's lien. Though not a bank-
ruptcy case, the decision is nonetheless important because of the
status it grants to mechanic's liens. 17 A mechanic's lien, the Fifth
Circuit also held, would be superior to the federally-created lien
only so long as the mechanic remains in continuous possession of the
collateral."'
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also held that
since protection is provided for future advances secured by earlier
security agreements under the Uniform Commercial Code,"4 the
choateness doctrine would not be invoked to give priority to a fed-
eral mortgage claim over a secured creditor making a future ad-
vance.150
Taken together, these decisions seem to indicate that the Tax
Lien Act' standards may serve as a benchmark for the determina-
tion of priorities of federal vis-A-vis state-created liens.
VII. AcCESS TO BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
A. Entity Status
In 1977, the Middle District of Florida refused to allow a corpo-
rate debtor, whose chapter XI petition was dismissed because of the
absence of unsecured creditors, to convert the proceedings to chap-
ter XII despite the debtor's contention that the corporate veil should
145. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); United States v. White,
325 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Stein v. Moot, 297 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Del. 1969). A
federal test of choateness is applied when at least one lien at issue is that of a federal entity.
United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965). But where no federal
interests are at stake, the validity, nature and effect of a state lien is still governed by state
law. See Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
146. 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 446
F.2d 136 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971), which the Fifth Circuit construed to
hold that "in light of the Tax Lien Act, the choateness doctrine would not be applied to
determine the relative priority of a lien for attorney's fees contained in a first mortgage on
farm property and a second mortgage lien held by" the Farmers Home Administration. 563
F,2d at 684-85.
147. See FA. STAT. § 679.310 (1977).
148. 563 F.2d at 691.
149. See FLA. STAT. § 679.204 (1977).
150. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977). For the
Florida UCC provisions on priorities of security interests, see FLA. STAT. § 679.312 (1977).
151. I.R.C. H9 6321-26.
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be ignored.'52 Since the debtor had, four years prior to the filing of
the petition, agreed to corporate status for the purpose of securing
a loan, the fact that it had never issued stock, maintained a bank
account or evinced other corporate attributes, did not preclude its
recognition by the court as a corporation.'53
The court distinguished this case from situations where the
trustee seeks to pierce the corporate veil in order to prevent injustice
to creditors, noting that its equitable powers may be used to provide
such relief.'
B. Civil Rights
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,"' held that
an employer does not violate section 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Act of
1871111 by firing an employee because he is adjudged bankrupt.
Basing its decision on an equal protection analysis, 5 ' the Fifth
Circuit noted that if the defendant's actions would be legal apart
from section 1985(3), "the conspiracy could not have deprived the
plaintiff of the 'protection of the laws."" 8 Since nothing in the
Bankruptcy Act nor any law in Mississippi expressly prohibited an
152. In re Eastwood Properties, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1023 (Nov. 9, 1977).
153. Chapter XII proceedings are available only to noncorporate entities. Bankruptcy
Act § 406(6), 11 U.S.C. § 806(6) (1970). Chapter XI proceedings, meanwhile, are available to
both corporate and noncorporate entities.
154. 3 BANKR. CT. DEc. at 1025. See also Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966);
Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959).
155. 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). That section provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons .. .conspire . ..for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . ..in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having or exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
157. The court pointed out that four elements comprise a cause of action under § 1985
(3), as mandated by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971):
(1) the defendants must conspire
(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; and
(3) the defendants must act in furtherance of the conspiracy whereby
(4) one was (a) injured in his person or property or (b) deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
545 F.2d at 923. The court focused on paragraph (2) above.
158. 545 F.2d at 925.
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employer from firing a bankrupt employee, the court found for the
defendants.'
Although criticized since its publication,' the McLellan
"independent illegality" test has not been rejected by any other
court. Until rejected by the Supreme Court or changed by statute,
the test appears to fashion a reasonably clear standard for the Fifth
Circuit.
VIII. REJECTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
Section 70b of the Act 6' provides that the trustee must assume
or reject an "executory contract" within sixty days of adjudication
or within thirty days of his qualification, whichever is later. Any
contract not assumed or rejected within the time is deemed rejected
by operation of the statute. Under section 313(1) of the Act,1" the
court may permit rejection of any executory contract of the debtor
upon notice to the other parties to the contract. The trustee's rejec-
tion is deemed a breach of contract as of the date of filing the
original chapter XI petition.'"1
Under section 313 of the Act, 6' there is no limit on the bank-
ruptcy court's authority to reject an executory contract so long as it
is truly executory.'"1 The executory contract may not be partly re-
jected; it must be completely rejected or assumed.'"6
Though not defined in the Act itself, the case law views an
executory contract as one in which "there remains any part . . .
unperformed."'' 7 To be remembered is that section 70b of the Act
authorizes the trustee to apply for permission to reject a contract
that is executory "in whole or in part.""' If the contract is rejected
with the court's permission, the breach resulting therefrom may
159. The court did point out, however, that both of the proposed new Bankruptcy Acts
contain identical language that would prohibit discriminatory action against a person who
has filed for bankruptcy. Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R.
31-32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 357, app. (1975 & 1976).
Currently, there is no fundamental right to file in bankruptcy. United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
160. See 90 HARV. L. REv. 1721 (1977).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
162. Id. § 713(1) (1970).
163. Bankruptcy Act § 63c, 11 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1970).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 713 (1970).
165. See In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 8 COLLi-R
3.1511l.
166. 8 COLUER 3.15[7].
167. See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1960).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
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transform the other party to the contract into a creditor of the
estate.
In In re Kassabay,'6 9 the debtor entered into a series of interre-
lated agreements whereby a real estate developer would construct
apartment projects on the debtor's land. An "agreement for deed"
provided that if the construction agreement were not in default, the
developer could himself acquire the real estate.
While in default, the developer attempted to sell his interest to
a third corporation. An agreement reflecting that sale was recorded,
thereby putting a cloud on the debtor's title. The court held that
the "agreement for deed," since it was not intended to secure the
payment of money, was technically not a mortgage and, therefore,
could not properly be recorded.7 0 Moreover, since agreements for
deeds are executory contracts,"' the developer was held to have no
lien on the property and was relegated to the status of an unsecured
creditor.
IX. APPARENT TITLE
Section 726.09 of the Florida Statutes' operates to vest abso-
lute title to chattels in one who receives them as a pretended loan
for two years without a demand for their return.7 3 This statute is
used occasionally by the bankruptcy trustee to take title to property
that has been "loaned" to the bankrupt for two years without a
demand for its return.
Section 726.09 was held in 1975 not to apply to leases.'74 It has
been recognized, however, that while the trustee may not hold a lien
on property formally leased to the trustee, he nonetheless succeeds
to the bankrupt's rights as lessee. "'
X. PROCEDURE
A. Amended Claims
The filing deadline for statements of claim under the Act is
169. No. 76-380 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 1977).
170. See FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1977).
171. First Mortgage Corp. v. deGive, 177 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
172. FLA. STAT. § 726.09 (1977).
173. The statute has the same effect on loaned property which is "pretended" to have
been tendered to another with a conditional reversion, remainder or similar interest remain-
ing in the lender, unless the loan reservation or limitation is declared by a recorded document.
Id.
174. American Indus. Leasing Co. v. Searles, 510 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1975).
175. American Indus. Leasing Co. v. Searles, 13 C.B.C. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1977), on remandfrom 510 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1975). FLA. STAT. § 726.09 (1977) is also inapplicable to mutual
bailments. See In re Aircraft Casting, Inc., No. 76-899 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1977).
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more than just a statute of limitations; it is absolute, as equity
proof, and may not be extended by the bankruptcy court.' This
principle was reinforced in 1977 when a creditor attempted to file a
proof of claim eighteen months after a deadline; the motion was
denied.' 7
Where, however, a creditor, prior to the expiration of the filing
deadline, takes some action against the trustee from which the court
may ascertain the nature and amount of the claim, the creditor may
subsequently amend the claim after expiration of the filing period. 8
B. Discovery
In In re Dade County Dairies, Inc., ' an involuntary proceed-
ing, creditors sought an examination of the bankrupt's records pur-
suant to Bankruptcy Rule 205.110
The bankrupt first complained that the requested information
was outside the scope of the transfer alleged in the petition. The
court, in rejecting this objection, analogized to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure' and, finding the requested information
"relevant," held it discoverable.
The bankruptcy court, however, also found that the receiver, to
whom the records had been surrendered involuntarily, unjustifiably
granted the creditors full access without the bankrupt being af-
forded the opportunity to object and obtain a ruling. 82
XI. FEES
Apparently prompted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's recent decision in American Benefit Life Insurance Co. v.
176. Section 57n of the Act provides, in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
all claims provable under this title, . . . shall be proved and filed in the manner provided in
this section. Claims which are not filed within six months after the first date set for the first
meeting of creditors shall not be allowed." Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1970).
177. In re Gallagher, No. 75-430 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 1977). Judge Britton remarked, "It
has not been suggested that any person would be prejudiced if this creditor is allowed now to
file its claim. The motion is not opposed. If I had the lawful discretion to do so, I would grant
the motion." Id.
178. In re Kilpatrick, No. 75-1798 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 1977). The court also cited Fausett
v. Murner, 402 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1968) and 3 COLUER 57.11[3] for the proposition that so
long as the existence, nature and amount of the claim is ascertained, and the parties would
not be unduly prejudiced, an amendment would be allowed. The court "reluctantly" granted
the motion to amend.
179. No. 77-841 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 1977).
180. 11 U.S.C. Rule 205 (Supp. 1111973).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
182. The court distinguished this case from a voluntary proceeding, where the bank-
rupt's records are open to any creditor. No. 77-841.
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Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp.),"3 the bankruptcy courts dealt
more thoroughly and in greater detail with the questions raised by
attorneys' fees. While most individual fee application decisions turn
on their own facts and do not merit individual discussion, the al-
ready substantial and growing body of law concerning such awards
is of the utmost importance to the practitioner.
A previously established twelve-part test for determining the
reasonableness of attorneys' fees was applied to bankruptcy cases
for the first time in First Colonial.'5 4 It requires consideration of:
(1) The time and labor required; (2) The novelty and difficulty
of the questions; (3) The skill requisite to perform; (4) The pre-
clusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case; (5) The customary fee; (6) Whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (7) Time limitations imposed by the client or other
circumstances; (8) The amount involved and the results ob-
tained; (9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attor-
neys; (10) The "undesirability" of the case; (11) The nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; (12)
Awards in similar cases. 1'
The district courts and bankruptcy judges are given broad dis-
cretion in determining attorneys' fees in connection with bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and the determination will not be disturbed
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.", First
Colonial does require that, in awarding attorneys' fees, the bank-
ruptcy judge be "particularly diligent in setting forth the facts that
support [the] conclusion."'87
In addition to the twelve enumerated criteria for the determina-
tion of attorneys' fees, First Colonial requires that, because of the
peculiar nature of bankruptcy proceedings, attorneys "should not
expect to be compensated as generously for their services as they
might be were they" otherwise employed. 8
183. 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1977).
184. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Section
64a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides that attorneys' fees must be
reasonable.
185. 544 F.2d at 1298-99 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
at 717-19).
186. First Colonial, 544 F.2d at 1298. See Morgan v. Walter E. Heller & Co. (In re
Bemporad Carpet Mills, Inc.), 434 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1970); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1968).
187. 544 F.2d at 1298.
188. Id. at 1299. In determination of the actual amount of compensation, First Colonial
mandates a three-step process: First, the court "must ascertain the nature and extent of the
services supplied by the attorney" through a statement filed by the attorney, reciting the
number of hours worked and a description of how the time was spent. Id. Second, the judge
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Later in 1977, the Fifth Circuit also held that interim allow-
ances must be set below any final fee." 9
Attorneys' fees incurred in the rendering of services for the
bankrupt are entitled to first priority as "administrative expenses"
under section 64a(1) of the Act. 190 Compensable services are only
those which "have aided in the administration of the estate, that is
to say they must have assisted the bankrupt in performing his legal
duties, not in exercising his legal privileges."'' Any service volun-
teered or rendered without clear prior authorization is not compens-
able. '9 It is often said that the bankrupt's attorney is the "courts'
favorite object in furthering economy. ''93
XII. DISCHARGES
A. Debtors
Section 14c(7) of the Act"' provides that a discharge may be
granted unless, inter alia, the bankrupt "has failed to explain satis-
factorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabil-
ities." Normally, though, if the circumstances were "such that the
normal person under like circumstances would not have kept books
and records," the bankrupt will not be penalized for having failed
to do so.'95
1. BOOKS AND RECORDS
Thus, failure to keep books and records in a small (five automo-
biles) taxi cab business, where nearly all transactions were handled
in cash, did not prevent a discharge.'
sets the value of the services, under the twelve-part test. Id. at 1300. Third, the judge must
explain his findings in detail. Id.
189. Machinery Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 551 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.
1977). See also Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y v. Duecy, 422 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1970).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970). Section 62 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 102 (1970), author-
izes the award of compensation from the bankrupt estate to attorneys for the trustee who
assist in the administration of the estate. Section 64, mbanwhile, gives priority to costs and
expenses incurred in administration of the estate itself.
191. In re Rods & Guns, Inc., No. 76-1625 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 1977).
192. Id.
193. 3A COL IER 62.31[5].
In addition, Judge Britton has noted that through June 1975, trustees' and receivers'
attorneys' fees nationwide averaged 6.7% of the total realized in bankruptcy cases. In the
Southern District of Florida, for the same period, the fees averaged 10.9%. See In re Daryl
Indus., Inc., No. 73-239 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 1977). Based on this data, and the language of
First Colonial, it is likely that the bankruptcy courts, in Florida at least, will subject attor-
neys' fees to strict scrutiny in the future.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(7) (1970).
195. In re Weismann, 1 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
196. In re King, 13 C.B.C. 224 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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2. BURDEN OF PROOF
While Bankruptcy Rule 407 places the original burden of proof
under section 14c of the Act on the creditor, it was pointed out in
1977 that there remains a de facto burden on the debtor to show his
innocence.'1
3. DEBTOR'S INTENT
It was also recognized during 1977 that a violation of section
14c(4) 118 cannot occur through a transfer of exempt homestead prop-
erty, regardless of the transferee's intent.' Moreover, the reconvey-
ance of fraudulently transferred property, even when the reconvey-
ance occurs prior to filing of the petition, does not serve as a defense
to section 14c(4). 2"
The Middle District of Florida recognized that so long as a
debtor intends to transfer property in an effort to conceal the prop-
erty from creditors, his motivation for so acting, even if highly al-
truistic (e.g., to help pay for a sick relative's medical care), is not a
valid defense in an action to bar a discharge.20 '
B. Fraudulent Debts
Section 17a of the Act 202 exempts from discharge any provable
debt of the bankrupt created or obtained by fraud.203 In Oneida
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Cote (In re Cote),20 ' the secured
197. Appelberg v. Harrison (In re Harrison, Jr.), 12 C.B.C. 728 (M.D. Fla. 1977). See also
In re Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 660, 660-61 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
198. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(4), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(4) (1970). This section precludes a
discharge where the bankrupt, "at any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, transferred, removed, de-
stroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."
199. Bank of Miami v. Abaunza (In re Abaunza), No. 76-1611 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 1977).
200. Id.
201. McLeran v. Hobbs (In re Hobbs), 12 C.B.C. 663 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
202. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
203. Section 17a provides, in pertinent part:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . (2) are liabilities
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for
obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of
credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his
financial condition made or published or caused to be made or published in any
manner whatsoever with intent to deceive, or for willful and malicious conversion
by another . . . [and except such as] (4) were created by his fraud, embezzle-
ment, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fidu-
ciary capacity.
11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
204. No. 76-425 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1977).
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creditor argued that the debtor had violated section 17a(2) by dis-
posing of the collateral without the creditor's consent.
The court first noted that in order to maintain an action for
conversion at common law, the plaintiff must show a denial of a
possessory right. Absent default by the debtor, however, the creditor
has no such right. Next, the court addressed the issue of whether
the creditor had been deprived of its lien through disposition of the
collateral. Since the lien remains enforceable, as against subsequent
transferees, the question was answered in the negative. Finally,
without the requisite showing of malice and willfulness, the court
held that a charge of conversion could not stand. 0
In another case, the court held that under section 17a (2) of the
Act, 10 the issuance of a worthless check is not sufficient to preclude
the right to a discharge, absent affirmative proof of actual fraud. 07
A similar case found that where an agent of the creditor knows the
debtor's check is worthless, such knowledge will not be imputed to
the creditor himself."8 This rule comports with accepted agency
principles, which provide that knowledge of an agent is not imputed
to the principal where the agent acts adversely to the principal's
interest. According to the Middle District of Florida, knowing ac-
ceptance of a worthless check for the benefit of a principal by an
agent is not a sufficient defense for a debtor in a section 17a action.
Section 17a(4) of the Act 0° also denies a discharge where a
liability was created by the bankrupt's fraud while acting as an
officer or in any other fiduciary capacity. However, where the trus-
tee granted the bankrupt permission to dispose of assets, and so
notified the creditor, who took no action, the court held the debt
discharged as against the creditor." '°
205. Id. In Atlantic Bank v. Gilbert (In re Gilbert), No. 75-253 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 1977),
Judge Paskay pointed out that where a borrower promises to use the proceeds of a loan to
satisfy an existing indebtedness, the debtor's representations of his financial condition and
his promise will be relied upon by the creditor. If the borrower did not, in fact, intend to fulfill
that promise, a finding of "willful and malicious conversion" may be warranted.
206. See note 203 supra.
207. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Matin (In re Marin), 12 C.B.C. 100 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
208. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kurant (In re Kurant), No. 77-00004
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 1977).
209. See note 203 supra.
210. United States v. Park (In re Park), No. 75-1155 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 1977). The result
was obtained even though the bankrupt, the corporation's president, had used the corporate
assets for his own benefit. The court held that sale of the assets created a potential liability
only in favor of the corporation, not the creditor, since the creditor's lien did not in fact cover
the contested property. The court also noted, in dictum, that since the corporation had
already been adjudicated bankrupt at the time the transaction occurred, the alleged debtor
could not have been acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity, since the corporate affairs
were being managed by the trustee.
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C. Effects of Discharge
In In re Crouse,"' the court drew a fundamental distinction
between the bankrupt's personal liabilities and liens on its property:
a discharge releases the bankrupt's personal liabilities; a valid lien
which is not avoided pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act may still be
enforced." 2
The bankrupt also claimed that the security, household goods,
was exempt from enforcement of the lien under the Constitution of
Florida."1 3 The court noted, in rejecting this argument, that
"nothing in the Bankruptcy Act . . . invalidates an otherwise valid
lien against exempt property merely because it relates to exempt
property." ' 4 As pointed out elsewhere," 5 the bankruptcy court lacks
jurisdiction to rule upon exempt property because such property is
excluded from the bankrupt's estate. '
While the debtor can no longer be sued for the recovery of a
money judgment against him on a discharged debt, it is possible for
the debtor to "revive" this debt after discharge. When the debtor
does so and then defaults on the revived debt, the proper procedure
for the debtor who wishes to attempt to collect on the revived debt
is to seek a request for relief from the injunction issued under section
14f(2) of the Act."'
However, it is not by implication or ambiguity that a debt
discharged in bankruptcy will be revived. It is generally held that
"'to be enforceable the new promise must be definite, express, dis-
tinct, and unambiguous. The debts covered by the new promise
must be identified as those that were discharged in the bankruptcy
211. Nos. 76-1264, 76-1265 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1977).
212. A discharge in bankruptcy operates to "discharge the debt" and to enjoin creditors
from "instituting . . . any action . . . to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the
bankrupt." Binnick v. Avco Fin. Serv., 435 F. Supp. 359, 363 (D. Neb. 1977) (quoting, in part,
§ 14f(2) of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1970)) (emphasis added). See generally In re Thomp-
son, 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976); 1A CoLua 14.69, 17.29.
213. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2).
214. Nos. 76-1264, 76-1265.
215. See note 12 supra.
216. Had Crouse involved a money judgment instead of a lien against property, the result
would have been different since enforcement would require an in personam adjudication of
the bankrupt's rights.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1970). Section 14f provides that an order of discharge is to "(1)
declare that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in any court is null and void as
a determination of the personal liability of the bankrupt" for any debts not accepted from
the discharge under section 17; and (2) enjoin all creditors whose debts have been discharged
from "thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to collect such
debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt." For the proper procedure in pursuing a revived
debt that has fallen into default, see In re McCann, 387 F. Supp. 416, 417 (D. Kan. 1975).
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proceeding."''' It has also been held that a debt may be revived
"only when by an unequivocal statement in writing the debtor ex-
presses his present intention personally to obligate himself to pay
the debt." '219
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Andriesse (In re Andriesse),2 0 the
creditor sought relief from a stay in order to determine the full
amount of an allegedly revived debt. The bankrupt's conduct in her
employment had resulted in a loss to her employer of more than
$10,000, which had been covered by the creditor's bond and paid by
the creditor. Prior to filing the petition in bankruptcy, the state had
brought criminal charges against the employee, in which the plain-
tiff played no part. The result of that criminal prosecution was
probation, which required, among other things, that the bankrupt
pay the creditor almost $4,000 in monthly installments of $200.
In compliance with the probation order the defendant made
monthly installments. The creditor, claiming that the voluntary
payments under the probation order had revived the debt, sought
relief from the stay in order to litigate the amount still owed. This
was granted. The court did not inquire into the creditor's ability to
prove its allegation of revival, though the possibility would appear
slim if the debt were truly barred, since the "promise" contained in
the probation order did not run to more than $4,000 of the $10,000
debt.22'
218. Wichita City Teachers Credit Union v. Rider, 203 Kan. 552, 558, 456 P.2d 42, 48
(1969) (quoting 1 COLLIER 17.34).
219. Linzer v. Weitzen, 292 N.Y. 306, 309, 55 N.E.2d 42, 43 (1944).
220. No. 77-319 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 1977).
221. Presumably, the creditor could not prevent the discharge of the debt under § 17 of
the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), which only prevents the discharge of debts arising out of
certain intentional criminal wrongdoings. Also, § 14f of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (f) (1970),
does not bar a creditor from using otherwise lawful methods to persuade a debtor to revive
or to pay a discharged debt so long as those efforts do not include any legal process. Girardier
v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977). It is generally improper for a creditor's
attorney to threaten criminal prosecution in order to collect a debt. The ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILY DR 7-105(a) states that "a lawyer shall not present, participate
in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter." See also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETEcs No. 7.
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